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We study backstop adoption and carbon dioxide emission paths in a two-region model with 
unilateral climate policy and non-renewable resource consumption. The regions have an equal 
endowment of the internationally tradable resource and a backstop technology. We first study 
the case of a unilateral stock constraint (e.g. a 450 ppmv carbon dioxide concentration target), 
and show that the non-abating region makes the final switch to the backstop before the 
abating region does, though the latter region has two disjoint phases of backstop use if its 
marginal cost is sufficiently low. Furthermore, we show that the abating region has an inverse 
N-shaped emission path, with growing  emissions in the period for which the ceiling is 
binding. In addition, there is a phase in which this region has a positive carbon price, but 
higher emissions than the non-abating region. With a global intertemporal carbon budget 
instead of a stock constraint, the order of definite backstop adoption is reversed and the 
abating region’s emissions are always lower. We also show that unilateral climate policy does 
not lead to international carbon leakage. 
JEL-Code: F18, O13, Q32, Q54. 
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1 Introduction
Althoughclimatechangeisaglobalproblem,onlyasubsetofcountriescurrentlyimposespoli-
cies to reduce harmful greenhouse gas (notably carbon dioxide, CO2) emissions. It is well-
known that, in response to such unilateral policies, non-abating regions might increase their
emissions,forexamplebecausetheworldpriceoffossilfuelsfallsduetoreduceddemandfrom
theabatingcountries. Atthesametime,itseemsinevitablethatsubstitutiontowardsnon-fossil
energy sources will take place, either because the stocks of oil and gas will decrease in the com-
ingdecennia, or becausea price onCO2 emissionsmakestheuse offossil fuels moreexpensive
in regions with climate policy.
Inthispaper, wemodelcarbondioxideemissionsandadoptionofacleanbackstoptechnology
in a two-region model where emissions stem from the use of a physically exhaustible non-
renewable resource. We show that the abating region need not be the ﬁrst one to adopt the
clean technology, but that the order of deﬁnite backstop adoption depends on the type of uni-
lateral policy imposed. With a unilaterally imposed ceiling on the total amount of CO2 in the
atmosphere, the abating region can have two disjoint phases of backstop technology use if the
marginal cost of the backstop is sufﬁciently low.
Sincecarbondioxideemissionsstemlargelyfromtheuseofnon-renewablefossilfuels,climate
policy needs to be studied in the context of exhaustibility of energy resources as introduced by
Hotelling (1931). Several papers have studied the adoption of a clean backstop technology in
this context, but only using closed economy models. Both Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) and
Tahvonen (1997) study adoption of a backstop technology in a closed economy with optimal
climate policy, i.e. using a damage function where damage stems from the stock of CO2 in the
atmosphere. In both papers, use of the backstop technology will initially be zero, but posi-
tive at a later date, if initial marginal damage is not too high. In Hoel and Kverndokk (1996),
the non-renewable resource is not physically exhaustible, but its use declines over time as the
unit extraction costs increase with cumulative extraction. With this model design, resource use
will be positive for all ﬁnite t. Tahvonen (1997) however, treats the fossil fuel as a physically
exhaustible, non-renewable resource. He shows that if the marginal cost of the backstop is suf-
ﬁciently high, the resource stock will be exhausted in ﬁnite time, and ultimately the economy
only uses the backstop.
Chakravorty, Magné and Moreaux (2006) study the case of a stock constraint, rather than op-
timal climate policy, with a physically exhaustible resource. The authors assume an imposed
ceilingonthestockofcarbondioxideintheatmosphere. Atsomepointintime,emissionsfrom
the use of the resource become smaller than natural decay of the stock of pollution, the stock
starts to decline and hence the ceiling is no longer binding. With a stationary demand curve,
the backstop will be used during the period for which the ceiling is binding, only if its marginal
cost is sufﬁciently low. However, in this case it will be used jointly with the non-renewable
resource, until the resource stock gets exhausted. If initial demand is sufﬁciently high but de-
clinesrapidly over time because ofan inward-shiftingdemandcurve, thebackstopwill be used
in two disjoint phases, provided its marginal cost is sufﬁciently low. In this case it will ﬁrst be
used, together with the resource, when the ceiling becomes binding, with increasing resource
use until the backstop becomes too expensive. The second phase is the end phase when re-
source stocks are exhausted. Chakravorty, Moreaux and Tidball (2008) study a similar problem
as that in Chakravorty et al. (2006), but assume the presence of two fossil fuels that differ in
their carbon content. Regarding backstop technology, however, they assume that it will only
be used after the imposed ceiling ceases to be binding, due to very high marginal cost of the
backstop.
As we study backstop adoption and carbon dioxide emissions in a two-region model, we areUNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 3
also able to study carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs when emission reductions by some
countries induce an increase in emissions by other countries, for example due to a lower world




offset by the increase in emissions by countries outside the Kyoto Protocol generally ranges
from 2 to 41% (see for example Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2000). Babiker (2005) even ﬁnds
a leakage rate of 130% for one of his scenarios. That is, in response to an emission reduction in
some countries, other countries increase their emissions by an even larger amount, such that
global emissions increase and global warming actually accelerates.
None of these papers on leakage model fossil fuels as being non-renewable. As suggested by
Sinn (2008), when resource owners continue to extract the planned amounts of the resource in
order to exploit their entire resource stocks over time, this will lead to a lower resource price,
a leakage rate of 100%, and zero effectiveness of unilateral emission reductions. Thus far, only
two papers have discussed unilateral climate policy in the context of non-renewable resources.
The ﬁrst is a paper by Hoel (2008), which discusses the effect of a decrease in the price of a
backstop technology on global emissions, when countries differ in their exogenous carbon tax.
However,itdoesnotdiscusscarbonleakagefromunilateralclimatepolicy,assuch. Thesecond
paper is Eichner and Pethig (2009). In that paper, the authors study carbon leakage in a three-
region, two-period model without a backstop technology, for the case of an exogenous and
unilateral ﬂow constraint. They establish conditions under which global emissions increase in
response to a tightening of the constraint.
Thepresentpaperdiscussesboththeadoptionofabackstoptechnologyandcarbonleakage,in
a model in which consumption only stems from energy use. We study two types of unilaterally
imposed climate policy. First, we study the case of a stock constraint, or atmospheric CO2 con-
centration target, which can be used to achieve the ‘ultimate objective’ of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which is “stabilization of greenhouse gas concen-
trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system.” (Article 2, UNFCCC) However, because of scientiﬁc uncertainty
on how concentration levels map into temperature levels, Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones,
Lowe, Meinshausen and Meinshausen (2009) suggest to restrict global cumulative emissions
over time. Such a policy implicitly imposes a global cumulative carbon budget, whereby some
of the world’s stocks of fossil fuels will have to be left in the ground. We therefore also study the
effects of this type of policy, when unilaterally imposed, on backstop technology adoption and
emission paths.
Weassumethattheresourceisinternationallytradable,andresourceownersinthetworegions
in the model (one abating, one non-abating) take the world-price of the resource as given. We
show that, in case of a unilateral stock constraint, the emissions path of the abating region
follows an inverse N-shaped path, with rising emissions in the period for which the ceiling is
binding. Furthermore, the abating region has two disjoint phases of backstop technology use
if the marginal cost of the backstop is sufﬁciently low. It is even possible for the abating region
to have an upward jump in emissions and energy consumption at the instant at which the
non-abating region switches to the backstop. Moreover, with a unilateral stock constraint, the
non-abating region makes the deﬁnite switch to the backstop ahead of the abating region, and
thereisalwaysaperiodinwhichtheabatingregionfacesapositivepriceonemissionswhileits
emission levels still are higher than those in the non-abating region, despite a common world
price for the non-renewable resource.
With a unilaterally imposed global cumulative carbon budget however, disjoint backstop use isUNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 4
not possible, whereas the order of deﬁnite backstop adoption is reversed compared to the case
of a stock constraint. With this policy type, emissions in the abating region are always lower
than emissions in the non-abating region.
For either type of policy, unilateral emission reductions are 100% effective, as the non-abating
region does not adjust its emissions in response to climate policy in the abating region.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we introduce the basic model, with
unilateralclimatepolicymodelledasaceilingonthestockofcarbondioxideintheatmosphere.
In section 3, we present our results regarding emissions by the non-abating region. In section
4, we study the order of backstop adoption by the two regions, and the path of carbon dioxide
emissions by the abating region. We then study both of these for an alternative type of policy:
a unilaterally imposed global intertemporal carbon budget. We summarize and discuss our
results in section 6.
2 The model
We model two regions i 2 {A,N} that are identical in their endowments and preferences. Each
region holds a stock of a non-renewable resource of size X0. Instantaneous utility U(qi(t)) is
strictlyconcavefunction, where qi istheamountofenergythatisconsumedinregion i. Utility
only comes from the consumption of energy, where energy from a polluting non-renewable
resource x and a clean backstop technology y are perfect substitutes: qi(t)Æ xi(t)Åyi(t). The
backstop is available at constant marginal costs c and is only domestically available.1 Since
the non-renewable resource can be freely traded between the two regions, there is one world
price. All agents take all prices as given. Throughout the paper we will use the social planner’s
solution to the problem under scrutiny. As there are no market failures within each region, the
decentralized economies give the same optimal extraction and consumption paths.
We assume that region A (for ’Abating’; N indicates the non-abating region) unilaterally im-
poses a ceiling on the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This stock of pollution is
indicated by Z(t); it grows due to emissions from the two countries, where one unit of re-
source consumption causes one unit of emissions, and declines due to natural decay: ˙ Z(t) Æ
P
i xi(t)¡±Z(t).2 Hereandintheremainderofthepaper, adotoveravariabledenotesthetime
derivative of that variable. We indicate the restriction on the stock of pollution, as unilaterally
imposed by region A, by Z.











s.t. qi(t)Æ xi(t)Åyi(t); (2)
xi




s(t)dt · X i(0)Æ X0; xi
s(t)¸0, (3)
where region A in addition faces the restriction:




xi(t)¡±Z(t)8t; Z(0)Æ Z0 Ç Z given. (5)
1One could think of the backstop as being solar energy, which is hardly traded internationally. See e.g. Chakra-
vorty et al. (2006, 2008).
2Exponential decay is a rough but commonly used approximation of the natural uptake of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere by natural sinks like forests and the oceans. See e.g. Withagen (1994), Tahvonen (1997), Chakravorty et
al. (2006, 2008).UNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 5
The rate of pure time preference is indicated by ½, and xi
s is the amount of the resource that is





s (t)Æ xA(t)ÅxN(t). (6)
Then, at each point in time, each region has to decide how much of the resource it should
supply to the world market, and how much it should consume of the resource and of energy
provided by the backstop technology. If, at some point in time, domestic extraction and con-
sumption differ, the region builds up or brings down a stock of claims on the resource of the







where Mi is region i’s stock of claims on the other region, r(t) is the interest rate (which is
determined on international markets and is taken as given by each region), and p(t) is the
price of the resource on the world-market. Combined with the preferences and endowments













































where, for region i, ¸i
X is the co-state variable to (3), ¸i
M is the co-state variable to (7), and the
°s are Lagrange multipliers to the non-negativity constraints. For region A, ¿ is the co-state
variable to (5) and ¹ is the Lagrange multiplier to the restriction in (4). Note that we changed
the sign of ¿ so that we can interpret it as a (shadow) price for carbon dioxide emissions. For
the remainder of the paper, we normalize ¸A















































¡ ˙ ¿(t)Æ¡½¿(t) ˙ ¿(t)Æ(½Å±)¿(t)¡¹(t). (16)
Equations (10)-(11) state that marginal beneﬁt from energy use, has to equal marginal costs,
whereby ¸i
M(t) converts the world price of the resource into units of utility. Equation (12) re-
lates the world resource price to the local scarcity rent. Equation (14) gives the Hotelling ruleUNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 6
that the scarcity rent of the resource has to grow at the rate of time preference. Equations (15)-
(16) are the equations of motion for the co-state variables to the stock of resource claims and
the stock of pollution, respectively. Equation (16) shows that as long as the ceiling on the stock
of carbon dioxide is not yet binding, the carbon price has to grow. We deﬁne the amount of en-
ergy consumed whenU0(¢)Æc by ¯ q. If in addition only the backstop is used, then qi(t)Æ ¯ q Æ ¯ y.






























have to hold. From integration of (14), combined with (20), and (10)-(13) and the comple-
mentary slackness conditions (17)-(18), then follows that region i’s resource stocks have to be
depleted when ¸i
M(t)p(t) Æ ¸i
X(t) equals c. We deﬁne this instant, at which region i switches
to the backstop, as t ÆT i
b, hence from (14) we have ¸i
X(0)e½T i
b Æc.
We now brieﬂy discuss the case in which neither region faces climate policy at any point in
time. Taking the time derivative of (10) and (12) and combining the results with each other and







whenever xi(t) Æ qi(t). Here and in the remainder of the paper, a hat over a variable denotes
its growth rate. We denote equilibrium variables for this laissez-faire economy, in which both
countries never face climate policy, by an asterisk ¤. We deﬁne ´(qi(t)) ´ ¡U00qi/U0 È 0 as the
coefﬁcientofrelativeriskaversion, ortheinverseoftheelasticityofintertemporalsubstitution.
In both countries, consumption under laissez-faire declines over time. From (14), (15) and the
time derivative of (12) follows that the world-price of the resource p(t) grows at the rate of
interest. Given our normalization ¸A
M(0) ´ 1 and the fact that both countries face the same
world price for the resource, ¸N
X (0) has to be set such that it exactly exhausts its resource stock
at the instant of the switch to the backstop. With a unilaterally imposed restriction on the stock
of pollution by A, this region has to set ¸A
X(0) and ¿(0) such that it exhausts its resource stock
and meets the pollution constraint.
Since,underlaissez-faire,consumptionineachregiondeclinesateachpointintime,aggregate
supply has to decrease as well. Although global supply equals global demand at each point in
time (equation (6)), the extraction rates of the individual countries and the pattern of trade
cannot be determined: resources from the two countries are considered as perfect substitutes
in consumption, while each region’s planner is indifferent to how much to extract at each point
in time.
3 Emissions by the non-abating region
In this section, we study how the non-abating region responds to an emission reduction in
region A, and to what extent this can lead to carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs if theUNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 7
non-abating region increases its emissions in response to an emission reduction in region A,
for example because of a lower world price for fossil fuels. Formally, there is carbon leakage
at instant t if f xA(t) Ç xi¤
(t) and xN(t) È xi¤
(t), where f xA(t) is the amount of emissions in the
abating region, when ¿(t)È0.
We ﬁrst prove the following useful intermediate result:
Lemma 1. Suppose two regions are described by equations (1)-(7). Then
R 1
0 xi(t)dt Æ X0. That
is, over time each region consumes an amount of the non-renewable resource equal to its own
endowment.
Proof. Since, in each region, energy consumption switches to the backstop in ﬁnite time, it
follows from (7), (15) and (21) that limt!1Mi(t)Æ0. Combining (12) in growth rates, (14), and




The value of the interest rate is undetermined: given that both the return on assets and the
growthrateoftheworldpricefortheresourceisequaltor(t),theﬁndingsaboveareimmaterial
to the exact value of the interest rate.
With this result in hand, we can show the effect of unilateral climate policy on emissions in the
non-abating region:
Proposition 1. Suppose two regions are described by equations (1)-(7). Then xN(t) Æ xi¤
(t) 8t.
That is, the non-abating region will not change its emission path in response to a change in
emissions in the abating region.
Proof. From Lemma 1 and the fact that all results are immaterial to r(t) follows that (23) holds
for N irrespective of what A does. Since neither X0 nor the time horizon has changed, xN(t) Æ
xi¤
(t) 8t.
This immediately gives the following result on carbon leakage:
Corollary 1. Suppose two regions are described by equations (1)-(7). Then unilateral climate
policy will not lead to any carbon leakage.
Since the non-abating region does not change its emissions path in response to climate policy
in the other region, carbon leakage is zero. This result shows that the simplest extension of the
standard closed-economy non-renewable resource model towards a two-region model, leads
toaresultthatgoesagainstthesuggestionbySinn(2008)thatunilateralclimatepolicymightbe
100% ineffective: Corollary 1 states that unilateral climate policy is 100% effective. We ﬁnd this
surprising result by extending the standard closed-economy cake-eating model (for example
used in Withagen, 1994, Tahvonen, 1997, Chakravorty et al., 2006, 2008) to include a second,
identical region – except for its climate policy. Note that the result is independent of whether a
backstop technology is available.
The result is driven by the fact that the two regions will consume an amount equal to their own
resource stock in order to meet their transversality conditions. The non-abating region follows
a laissez-faire consumption and emission path, which are determined by (23), initial stocks
and the time horizon. Since neither of these is affected by the unilateral climate policy, the
non-abating region does not adjust its consumption and emission path, hence carbon leakage
is zero at each point in time.
In the next sections, we study the effect of unilateral climate policy on backstop adoption in




policy target for the abating region. For the rest of the section, we focus on the policy-relevant
cases and presume that X0, Z0, Z, ± and c are such that the following assumptions hold:
Assumption 1. 9T(X0,Z0,Z,±,c) ´ {tjlimt"T Z(TjX0,Z0,Z,±,c) Ç Z;Z(TjX0,Z0,Z,±,c) Æ Z} È
0, and ¿(t)È0 for a strictly positive interval of time.
That is, the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reaches the unilaterally imposed ceiling
at some point in time T È0 and stays there for a non-zero period of time.3
Assumption 2. xN(T(X0,Z0,Z,±,c))·±Z.
That is, the unilateral stock constraint is feasible.
Assumption 3. xA(t Æ0jX0,Z0,Z,±,c)Ç xN(t Æ0jX0,c)Æ xi¤
(t Æ0jX0,c).
Inwords: initialemissionsintheabatingregionarelowerthanunderlaissez-faire. Thisimplies
that the drop in the initial scarcity rent in A, compared to laissez-faire, is larger than the initial
shadow price for CO2 emissions. Note that the last equality follows from Proposition 1.
We show in Appendix A that Assumptions 1-3 imply that xN(T(X0,Z0,Z,±,c)) È 1
2±Z and c È
c ´{cj¯ y Æ±Z}. For future reference it is useful to deﬁne:
• c ´{cj¯ y Æ±Z ¡xN(TjX0,Z0,Z,±,c)}, i.e. if c Æc, the marginal cost of the backstop is such
that the associated amount of (backstop) energy consumption is equal to the maximally
allowedemissionsforregion A,attheinstantatwhichthestockofCO2 intheatmosphere
reaches the ceiling; and
• ˜ c ´{cjTH(X0,Z0,Z,±, ˜ c)ÆT N
b (X0, ˜ c)} where TH is the instant from which onward ¿(t)Æ0,
i.e. if c Æ ˜ c, the ceiling on the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere ceases to be
binding at the instant at which the non-abating region switches to the backstop.
These deﬁnitions allow us to study the effects of ‘high’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘low’ marginal costs
of backstop technology on its adoption and emission paths.
4.1 Case 1: high marginal cost of the backstop, c ¸c
In the current case we assume that marginal costs of the backstop are sufﬁciently high, such
that, when the ceiling is reached – given X0, Z0, Z, and ± – energy provision by the backstop is
smaller than (or equal to) the difference between fossil-energy use allowed by natural uptake
and fossil-energy use (and hence emissions) in the non-abating region. Note that here and
in the remainder of the paper, at each point in time, xN(t) is solely determined by the initial
resource stock X0, marginal cost of the backstop c, time preference parameter ½, and the exact
shape of the utility function (via equation (23)).
Deﬁne t ÆTC as the instant at which emission paths of the two regions cross. Emissions in the
abating region, and its adoption of the backstop technology, can then be described as follows:
3This instant T is unique. Suppose T is not unique. Then 9t Æ b T such that ˙ Z(b T) Æ 0 with ¨ Z(b T) È 0 and ¿(b T) Æ 0.





/U00(xA(b T))Ç0. Furthermore, ˙ xN(t)Ç
0 from (23). Combining this with the time derivative of (5) and ˙ Z(b T) Æ 0 gives ¨ Z(b T) Æ ˙ xA(b T)Å ˙ xN(b T) Ç 0. But














Figure 1: Energy consumption paths for the case c ·c Ç1.
Proposition 2. Suppose two regions are described by equations (1)-(7), and c ¸c. Then
a. The emission path of the abating region has an inverse N-shape: emissions decline until the
stock of carbon dioxide reaches the ceiling at t ÆT, then they rise until the constraint ceases to
be binding, after which emissions decline again; if c Ç 1, emissions are zero once the switch
to the backstop has been made;
b. There exist unique t ÆTC and t ÆTH, with TC ÇTH;
c. xA(t)È xN(t) 8t 2(TC,T A
b ), with T A
b Æ1 if c Æ1; that is, after t ÆTC and as long as xA(t)È
0,emissionsinregion A arehigherthanthoseinregion N, eventhoughinitially(upto t ÆTH)
the abating region still has effective climate policy (¿(t)È0);
d. If c Ç 1, TH Ç T N
b Ç T A
b , i.e. the non-abating region adopts the backstop earlier than the
abating region, but only after the ceiling ceases to be binding.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The energy consumption paths of the laissez-faire economy, the abating economy with a stock
constraint, and the non-abating region, are illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of ﬁnite marginal
cost of the backstop; the corresponding paths of the (shadow) prices are illustrated in Figure
2.4 For t ÇT i
b, the respective region’s consumption path is also its emission path.
The emissions path for the abating region has an inverse N-shape, that is, it contains a cycle
in which resource consumption and emissions ﬁrst go down until the stock of carbon dioxide
reaches the ceiling, then increases until this constraint ceases to be binding, and then declines





















Figure 2:Paths of resource shadow prices for the case c ·c Ç1.
following a ‘standard’ cake-eating consumption path until the switch toward the backstop has
been made. The new and perhaps surprising result is that emissions in the regulated region
increase during the period for which the constraint is actually binding. This result reﬂects the
interaction between the two regions via the stock constraint: as region A wants global emis-
sions not to be larger than ±Z once the stock of carbon dioxide reaches the ceiling, it cannot
emit more than the difference between natural uptake and emissions in the non-abating re-
gion. Since emissions in the latter region decline over time, the abating region can increase
its emissions during the phase in which it wants global emissions to be constant and equal to
natural uptake.
The emission paths cross at t Æ TC, at which instant both countries emit an amount equal to
half the natural uptake. At t Æ TH, the constraint ceases to be binding. Between TC and TH,
the abating region still has a price on emissions but has higher emissions than the non-abating
region. Its emissions are also higher during the phase in which neither region abates (until
region A switches to the backstop). This is due to the increased abundance of the resource
endowment as perceived by the abating region, as can be seen from equations (10) and (12).
When ¿(t) Æ 0, resource consumption is determined by the scarcity rent ¸i
X(t). Since, during
some period of time, the abating region can consume less of the resource than under laissez-
faire, more is available during periods of time in which it does not face a positive carbon price,
which is equivalent to having a larger resource stock at t Æ TH, compared to laissez-faire. As a
consequence,thescarcityrentoftheabatingregionislowerthanunderlaissez-faire,andhence
lower than the rent of the non-abating region. Assuming c is ﬁnite, ¸A
X equals the marginal cost
ofthebackstoptechnologyatalaterinstantthanthescarcityrentofthenon-abatingregion. As
a consequence, the latter region adopts the backstop before the abating region does (T N
b ÇT A
b ).UNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 11
4.2 Case 2: ‘intermediate’ marginal cost of the backstop,c 2(˜ c,c)
Next we discuss the case where the marginal cost of the backstop is sufﬁciently low, so that the
abating region will adopt it in the period for which the ceiling on the stock of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere is binding, and energy consumption in region A is continuous at each point in
time. Emissions in the abating region, and its adoption of the backstop, can then be described
as follows:
Proposition 3. Suppose two regions are described by equations (1)-(7), and c 2(˜ c,c). Then
a. The emission path of the abating region has an inverse N-shape with a downward jump at
t ÆT: emissions decline until the stock of carbon dioxide reaches the ceiling at t ÆT at which
instant they jump down; they rise until the constraint ceases to be binding, after which emis-
sions decline again; emissions are zero once the switch to the backstop has been made;
b. The abating region has two distinct phases in which the backstop is used: initially it only uses
the non-renewable; at t Æ T the non-renewable is partly substituted by the backstop; as long
as the ceiling is binding it gradually uses more of the resource until at t Æ TS Ç TH only the
non-renewable is used; the second phase is the end-phase in which only the backstop is used;
c. There exist unique t ÆTC and t ÆTH, with TC ÇTH ÇT N
b ;
d. xA(t) È xN(t) 8t 2 (TC,T A
b ); that is, after t Æ TC and until the ﬁnal switch to the backstop by
region A, emissions in region A are higher than those in region N, even though initially (up to
t ÆTH) the abating region still has effective climate policy (¿(t)È0).
e. TH Ç T N
b Ç T A
b , that is, the non-abating region adopts the backstop earlier than the abating
region, but only after the ceiling ceases to be binding.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The energy consumption paths of the laissez-faire economy, the abating economy with a stock
constraint, and the non-abating region for the case c 2(˜ c,c) are illustrated in Figure 3.5 As long
as qi(t) È y, emissions equal consumption. The corresponding paths of the (shadow) prices
are illustrated in Figure 4.
When c is sufﬁciently low, the abating region starts to use the backstop at the instant at which
the ceiling is reached. However, since the ceiling has to be binding for a positive period of
time (Assumption 1) and xN(T(¢)) È 1
2±Z, xA(T) È 0 so the backstop is used jointly with the
non-renewable. As the price on emissions declines over time, and as emissions by the non-
abating region decline, the abating region can increase its emissions and from some TS ÇTC Ç
TH onward the backstop is no longer used. However, the scarcity rent in the abating region
increasesovertime(see(14)),andatT A
b ÈTH itswitchestothebackstopagain,anditsresource
stock is exhausted. Again, the non-abating region switches to the backstop before the abating
region does, as the increased perceived abundance of the resource endowment in region A
causes its scarcity rent to fall, relative to laissez-faire. Note that energy consumption by the
abatingregioniscontinuousateachpointintime: itisthe composition ofenergyconsumption
that jumps at t ÆT.





















Figure 3:Energy consumption paths for the case c 2(˜ c,c).
4.3 Case 3: low marginal cost of the backstop, c 2(c, ˜ c]
When the marginal cost of the backstop is lower than or equal to ˜ c, given Assumptions 1-3,
energy consumption and hence utility of the non-abating region is no longer continuous:
Proposition 4. Suppose two regions are described by equations (1)-(7), and c 2(c, ˜ c]. Then
a. The emission path of the abating region has an inverse N-shape with a downward jump at
t Æ T and an upward jump at t Æ T N
b : emissions decline until the stock of carbon dioxide
reaches the ceiling at t Æ T at which instant they jump down; they rise until the non-abating
region switches to the backstop, at which instant energy consumption and emissions (i.) (for
sufﬁciently small ± or Z or sufﬁciently large X0 or Z0, all ceteris paribus) jump up to ±Z
and stay at this level until the constraint ceases to be binding and then decline again, or (ii.)
otherwise jump up to a level below or equal to ±Z and immediately start declining (i.e. T N
b Æ
TH); emissions are zero once the switch to the backstop is made;
b. The abating region has two distinct phases in which the backstop is used: initially it only uses
the non-renewable; at t ÆT the non-renewable is partly replaced by the backstop; then
i. if c ¸ c0 ´ {cj¯ y Æ 1
2± ¯ Z}, it gradually uses more of the resource until yA continuously goes
to zero at TS ÇT N
b , or
ii. if c Çc0, it gradually uses more of the resource until yA jumps to zero at t ÆT N
b ·TH;
the second phase is the end-phase in which only the backstop is used;
c. xA(t) È xN(t) 8t 2 (T N
b ,T A
b ) with T N
b · TH Ç T A
b ; that is, after the switch to the backstop by
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Figure 4:Paths of resource shadow prices for the case c 2(˜ c,c).
higher than those by region N (which equal zero), even though initially (up to t Æ TH) the
abating region still has effective climate policy; if c 2 (c0, ˜ c], then 9TC Ç T N
b such that the
emission paths cross, and xA(t)È xN(t) 8t 2(TC,T A
b ).
d. At t ÆT N
b , the shadow price for emissions in A jumps down.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The energy consumption paths of the laissez-faire economy, the abating economy with a stock
constraint, and the non-abating region are illustrated in Figure 5, for the case c Ç c Ç c0 Ç ˜ c.6
The corresponding paths of the (shadow) prices are illustrated in Figure 6.
WhenU0( ¯ q)Çc0,thelevelofutilityishigherthanthelevelofutilityfromconsuminganamount
of energy equal to half of the decay of CO2 in the atmosphere. As a consequence, the emission
paths of the two regions cannot cross while both have positive emissions: if they did, then
this would give a utility level that is lower than that of consuming energy from the backstop.
However, the abating region must have higher emissions than the non-abating region for some
period of time, for otherwise it would not exhaust its resource stock, which cannot be optimal
(violates (20)). Then, given c 2 (c, ˜ c], emissions in the abating region have to jump up at the
instant at which the non-abating region switches to the backstop, to a level smaller than (if the
constraint no longer binds) or equal to (if the constraint is still binding) ±Z. This upward jump
in emissions is induced by a downward jump in the shadow price for carbon emissions.
How can a jump in energy consumption, and hence in utility, be optimal for the non-abating
region, even when forward-looking agents know when t Æ T N
b ? Technically, the abating region
has to optimize over two distinct periods, with two versions of (5): it optimizes for t ¸T N
b with

























Figure 5:Energy consumption paths for the case c 2(c, ˜ c]; c Çc Çc0 Ç ˜ c.
˙ Z Æ xA(t) and Z(t) · Z for Z(T N
b ) Æ Z and X A(T N
b ) given, and optimizes for t 2 [0,T N
b ) with
˙ Z Æ xA(t)ÅxN(t), xN(t)È0and Z(t)· Z for Z0 and X0 given.7 Astheemissionpathofthenon-
abating region is solely determined by its initial resource stock, the level of the marginal cost of
the backstop, and (23), the abating region has to determine its optimal emission path subject
to the decisions by region N and the ceiling on the stock of pollution. The downward jump in
emissions by N at t Æ T N
b cannot be affected by A in any way, and hence has to be taken as
given. As noted, in order to exploit its resource stock over time, instantaneous emissions have
to jump up at the instant at which the non-abating region switches to the backstop.
5 Emissionpathsandbackstopadoptionwithaunilaterallyimposed
intertemporal global carbon budget
AnimportantdrawbackofapolicyaimedatastabilizationlevelofatmosphericCO2 concentra-
tionasstudiedintheprevioussection, isthattheeventualequilibrialglobalmeantemperature
remains uncertain as it is uncertain how concentration levels map to temperature increases.
Allen et al. (2009) therefore propose to restrict global emissions in the 1750-2500 period to 1
trillion tonnes carbon (1 TtC, 3.67 trillion tonnes CO2). Such a global intertemporal carbon
budget implies that some of the stocks of fossil fuels, for example coal, will have to remain un-
exploited. The idea behind this proposal is that policy targets based on limiting cumulative
7In essence, the problem is one where at t Æ0 it is known that at a known later date the restriction on emissions
in region A will get alleviated. Di Maria, Smulders and Van der Werf (2008) study a related problem: announcement
of a future constraint on extraction and emissions in a closed economy with multiple resources. They ﬁnd that at
the instant of the policy announcement, extraction and emissions jump up, whereas they jump down at the instant

















Figure 6:Paths of resource shadow prices for the case c 2(c, ˜ c]; c Çc Çc0 Ç ˜ c.
emissionsofcarbondioxidearelikelytobemorerobusttoscientiﬁcuncertaintythanemission
rate or concentration targets. The authors ﬁnd that total anthropogenic emissions of 1 TtC,
about half of which has already been emitted since industrialization began, results in a most
likely peak in carbon-dioxide-induced warming of 2±C above pre-industrial temperatures.
We can implement this proposal in our model in the following way. The global carbon budget
from t Æ 0 (the year 2009, say) onwards is given by X. Note that natural uptake is not taken
into account, so ± Æ 0. In that case the total amount of CO2 that can be accumulated in the
atmosphere by region A is given and equal to (X ¡ X0) 2 (0,X0). As a consequence, the abat-
ing region has to consume less than its total endowment. The social planner in region A can
simply implement this by maximizing intertemporal utility subject to the resource constraint
R T A
b
0 xA(t)dt · X ¡X0 Ç X0. Consequently, there is no price on carbon emissions: the smaller
resource endowment simply induces a higher resource scarcity rent in the abating region, rela-
tivetolaissez-faire. Theeffectsofthecarbonbudgetonemissionsandadoptionofthebackstop
technology are as follows:
Proposition5. Suppose two regions are described by equations (1)-(7), ±Æ0, and X A
0 Æ X ¡X0 Ç
X N
0 Æ X0. Then
a. xA(t) Ç xN(t) 8t Ç T N




b that is, the abating region adopts the backstop earlier than the non-abating region.
Proof. See Appendix E










Figure 7: Energy consumption paths for a global intertemporal carbon budget.
carbon budget. The higher scarcity rent in region A causes emissions in this region to be lower
than under laissez-faire (and, hence, lower than those by the non-abating region) at each point
in time. Secondly the unilateral global budget induces asymmetric adoption of the backstop
technology. Since the growth rate of the rent is the same for both regions, a higher scarcity
rent in region A means that it equals the marginal cost of the backstop sooner, and the abating
region adopts the clean backstop technology before the non-abating region does. This result
is opposite to what we found in the previous section: with a unilateral stock constraint, it is
the non-abating region that makes the deﬁnite switch to the backstop ﬁrst. Hence, the order in
which the regions make the deﬁnite switch to the backstop depends on the type of unilateral
climate policy imposed.
6 Summary and discussion
We have studied backstop technology adoption in a two-region model, when carbon dioxide
emissions stem from consumption of a non-renewable resource, using the simplest possible
model: we have split the integrated world economy of the standard cake-eating model into
two identical regions with price-taking resource owners and a backstop technology, and stud-
ied the effects of unilateral emission reductions. First, we studied the case where the abating
region imposes a unilateral stock constraint. That is, the total amount of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere is not allowed to be larger than a certain amount (450 ppm CO2, say), but be-
cause of the natural uptake of carbon dioxide by the oceans and the terrestrial biosphere, the
abating region can still exhaust its entire resource stock over time, as long as it postpones its
emissions. We have shown that, for this type of unilateral policy, the non-abating region per-














Figure 8:Paths of resource shadow prices for a global intertemporal carbon budget.
backstop is sufﬁciently low, there is a phase for which the ceiling is binding and the abating
region jointly uses the non-renewable and the backstop, and hence the abating region has two
disjoint periods of backstop use. In addition we have shown that, generally, emissions in the
abating region will follow an inverse N-shaped path, with rising emissions in the period for
which the ceiling is binding. Furthermore there will be a period in which the abating region
has active climate policy, but higher emissions than the non-abating region.
As there is scientiﬁc uncertainty on how CO2 concentration levels map into temperature in-
creases, we have looked at a binding policy where the abating region decides that, over time,
no more than a given amount of carbon dioxide should be emitted globally; that is, the abating
region imposes a (feasible) intertemporal global carbon budget. Since the non-abating region
exhaustsitsresourcestocksanyway, theabatingregionisnotallowedtoexhaustitsentirestock
over time, and hence its scarcity rent is higher than under laissez-faire. When introducing a
backstop technology, this means that the abating region switches to this technology before the
non-abating region does, contrary to the case of a unilaterally imposed stock constraint.
Furthermore, we have shown that unilateral climate policy does not affect the emission path of
the non-abating region. As a consequence, unilateral emission reductions are 100% effective.
Thisresultisdrivenbytheintertemporalbudgetrestrictionofeachregion. Whenconsumption
deviates from extraction, and, hence, some of the resource is exported or imported, a stock of
claims on the other region’s resource stock grows or diminishes. Since, at any point in time,
both the resource price and the value of the stock of claims (with zero instantaneous net trade)
grow at the rate of interest, and since each region has to meet its intertemporal budget con-
straint, both regions consume and emit an amount equal to their initial resource endowments.
As our model is relatively simple, we now discuss how the results from the model containing a
stockconstraintareaffectedbyfourchangestoourmodel. WediscussdifferenttypesofclimateUNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 18
policy, the use of a second input in ﬁnal good production, a non-stationary demand curve, and
extraction costs.
Instead of a unilateral stock constraint, the abating region could introduce a constraint on the
ﬂow of its emissions, or it could impose optimal policy, with a trade-off between consump-
tion from energy and damages from the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere. With either of these
policies, the order of deﬁnite backstop adoption will be the same as under a stock constraint,
as in all cases the abating region has a lower scarcity rent than the non-abating region, due
to the increased perceived abundance after the imposition of climate policy. Neither the in-
verse N-shape in the emission path of the abating region, nor disjoint backstop use, can be
foundforthecaseofaunilateralﬂowconstraint,asemissionsbytheabatingregionwillbecon-
stant when constrained, and then declining. For the case of optimal climate policy,Tahvonen
(1997) has shown, for a closed (world) economy, that when the stock of pollution is allowed
to ﬁrst increase and then decrease (which is the outcome of the recent climate negotiations
in Copenhagen) and the third derivative of the strictly convex damage function (which is ad-
ditively separable from utility from resource consumption) is non-negative, global emissions
decrease monotonically.8 Keeping marginal damages as in Tahvonen’s result, a declining emis-
sion path for the non-abating region in a two-region world then implies that the emission path
oftheabatingregioncanhaveanyshape,dependingontheexactslopesofthepathofmarginal
damages and the path of emissions for the non-abating region. Consequently, neither an in-
verse N-shaped emission path for the abating region, nor disjoint backstop use for this region,
can be ruled out.
A second change to our model could be the introduction of a second input, as an imperfect
substitute for the energy good q, in the production of a ﬁnal good; for example a ﬁxed factor
such as inelastically supplied labour (see e.g. Eichner and Pethig, 2009), or a stock of capital.
In both cases, each region would have a second source of income, the level of which is affected
by the amount of the resource used in production. Hence, unilateral climate policy introduces
income effects, such that the abating region has a lower return on the second input and, there-
fore, a smaller intertemporal budget than the other region. Consequently, the abating region
consumes an amount smaller than its own endowment, resulting in a higher marginal utility of
income and higher scarcity rent. As a result it may make the ﬁnal switch to the backstop be-
fore the non-abating region, as in the case of a global carbon budget, and international carbon
leakage might be positive for some period of time. The inverse N-shaped emissions path in the
abating region, however, is likely to be unaffected by the introduction of a second, imperfectly
substitutable input. The introduction of a second, imperfectly substitutable, input, and the
possibility of non-zero carbon leakage, is an interesting line of future research.
In case of a stock constraint, the rising emissions in the abating region in the period during
whichtheconstraintisbinding,directlyfollowsfromthefactthatemissionsinthenon-abating
region decline due to a stationary demand curve and an ever-increasing scarcity rent. This
raises the question of what happens when the demand curve is non-stationary. We currently
see increasing demand for fossil fuels in most developed and developing countries, partly due
to increasing living standards within the latter countries, and due to an increasing world pop-
ulation. However, the pace at which living standards increase (notably in China) cannot be
indeﬁnitelysustained,whereasworldpopulationisexpectedtoshrinkinthemiddleorsecond-
half of this century.9 Chakravorty et al. (2006) study backstop adoption in the case of a closed
8The third derivative of an iso-elastic function, for example, is positive.
9Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov (2001) ﬁnd that there is a 55% chance of the world population reaching its peak
by 2075 and around 85% chance that this occurs by the end of the century. In the ’low’ and ’medium’ scenarios
of United Nations (2004), which differ in their assumptions on fertility rates, world population starts to decline
between 2025 and 2050, and between 2075 and 2100 respectively.UNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 19
economy with a ceiling on the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and ﬁnd that disjoint
use of the backstop (which we ﬁnd with a unilaterally imposed ceiling with c Ç c) might occur
inthecaseofaninward-shiftingdemandcurvewithnottoohighmarginalcostofthebackstop.
When the demand curve in region A does not shift outward too much, or the demand curve
in N does not shift inward too much, the order of backstop adoption is unaffected, since then
the scarcity rents of one region would not have to change too much in the direction of that of
the other. The inverse N-shaped consumption and emission path of the abating region holds
as long as the demand curve in the non-abating region does not shift out at too high a pace.
If it does, then emissions in region N rise over time, so emissions in A cannot rise when the
ceiling is binding. An inward-shifting demand curve in N, however, steepens the rising emis-
sion path in region A. Shifting demand curves do not affect our result regarding zero carbon
leakage. Again, as each region’s intertemporal budget restriction is unaffected, each consumes
an amount equal to its own endowment.
Aﬁnalextensionthatisworthwhiletodiscussistheintroductionofstock-dependentextraction
costs. In this case, when more of a resource stock is extracted (or less is available), the higher
the costs will be of extracting a unit of the resource. Hence, introduction of stock-dependent
extraction costs, per se, does not affect our model results, as each region starts with the same
endowment. Given our uniform world price for the resource, extraction in both regions is the
same at each point in time, therefore resource stocks and extraction costs are the same as well.
Stock-dependentextractioncostsonlymatterifinitialstocksaredifferent,and,hence,asecond
asymmetry between the two regions (next to the introduction of climate policy) is introduced
in our model. Clearly, in this case, the resource of the region with lowest extraction costs is
used, until unit extraction costs are equal for both countries. We leave the introduction of this
and further asymmetries (for example level of development or technology, or region sizes) to
future research.
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To ease notation in this and following appendices, we write xN(t) for xN(tjX0,c), and xA(t) for
xA(tjX0,Z0,Z,±,c).
First, we prove that Assumption 1 implies xN(T) È 1
2±Z. Suppose xN(T) Ç 1
2±Z. Then region
A can consume the same amount, without violating the constraint, and follow a laissez-faire
path like N. But then xN(T)ÅxA(T)Ç±Z and the constraint is not binding at T, which violates
Assumption 1. Now suppose xN(T) Æ 1
2±Z. Then A can consume the same amount, without
violating the constraint, and follow a laissez-faire path like N. But then xN(T)ÅxA(T) Æ ±Z,
and from (23) and (5), T ÆTH, which violates Assumption 1. Hence xN(T)È 1
2±Z.
Next, suppose c Çc. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply xN(T)·±Z. But c Çc implies xN(T)Æ0. Then
xA(T) Æ ±Z. But c Ç c implies xA(T) Æ 0, hence ˙ Z Æ 0 and the ceiling cannot be binding. This
violates Assumption 1, hence we cannot have c Çc.
Before we prove that we cannot have c Æc, we state and prove two Lemmas.UNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 21
Lemma 2. T N
b ¸T.
Proof. SupposeT N
b ÇT. Then±Z È xA(t)È±Zt 8t 2[T N
b ,T)and ˙ xA(t)È0toreach xA(t)Æ±Z.
But since ¹ Ç 0 8t Ç T, ˙ ¿ È 0, so with (14), the time derivative of (11) and U00 Ç 0 we ﬁnd
˙ xA(t)Ç0 8t ÇT. So, we cannot have T N
b ÇT.
Lemma 3. yA(t)Æ0 8t ÇT.
Proof. Suppose yA(t) È 0 for some t Ç T. Then either c Ç c, which we just ruled out, or A is
indifferentbetween x and y, so ¿È0 and ˙ ¿È0 for ¸A
X(t)Å¿(t)Æc (from (11) and(13)). Butthen
¹È0 which cannot hold for t ÇT. So, we cannot have yA(t)È0 for some t ÇT.
Nowsupposec Æc. Deﬁnet ÆTH astheinstantatwhichtheconstraint(4)ceasestobebinding.
Then xA(t) ¸ ±Z so TH Æ T A
b , and T N
b Æ T. From Lemma 3 then follows that ¸A
X(T)Å¿(T) Æ
¸N
X (T) Æ c. From (14) and (16) follows that the LHS of the latter equality grows faster than the
middle part for all t Ç T. But then xA(t) È xN(t) 8t Ç T which violates Assumption 3. Hence
we cannot have c Æc, which completes the proof that Assumptions 1-3 imply c Èc.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Since X0 isﬁniteand±È0, Z(t)Ç Z inﬁnitetime. Equations(16),(19),and(22)thenimplythat
¿ Æ 0 from this instant onward. Hence TH exists and is ﬁnite; since T is unique (see footnote
3), TH is unique too. Optimality requires (9) to be continuous. With (11), (12), (14), and (15),
this implies that qA must be continuous at t ÆTH. Since ¿(t)Æ 0 implies c xA Æ¡½/´(xA(t))Ç0
(see derivation of (23)), c xA Ç 0 8t 2 (TH,T A
b ) for c Ç 1; c xA Ç 0 8t È TH for c ! 1. For t È T A
b ,
xA(t)Æ0 so emissions are zero.
For all t ÇT, ¹(t)Æ0, so from (11), (12), (14), and (16) andU00 Ç0 follows that c xA Ç0 8t ÇT.
If c È c, ¯ y Ç ±Z ¡xN(T). If c Æ c, ¯ y Æ ±Z ¡xN(T). For all t 2 [T,TH], xN(t)Å f xA(t) Æ ±Z, while
(23) holds for N with qN(t) Æ xN(t). Hence c xA È 0 8t 2 (T,TH) and yA(t) Æ 0 8t Ç T A
b . This
completes the proof of part a.
By assumption, ¯ y Ç xA(0) Ç xN(0) Æ xi¤
(0). From Lemma 1, part a of this proposition, and
continuity of (9) then follows that 9t Æ TC Ç TH, with xA(TC) being continuous. This proves
part b.
Part c follows from a and b and the deﬁnition of TH.
From part c follows that xA(t) È xN(t) if ¿(t) Æ 0. From (14) and ¸i
X(T i
b) Æ c then follows that if
c Ç1, T A
b ÈT N
b , which proves part d.
C Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is identical to that of Proposition 2, except that in addition we need to prove the
downward jump in emissions at t Æ T, the use of the backstop during part of the phase in
which the ceiling is binding, and the role of ˜ c.
For all t 2 [T,TH], f xA(t) Æ ±Z ¡xN(t), for otherwise the constraint (4) would be violated. Since
continuity of (9) implies that qA(T) is continuous, and by assumption ¯ y È ±Z ÅxN(T), f xA(T)
jumpsdownto±Z¡xN(T)and yA(T)jumpsfromzeroto ¯ y¡±ZÅxN(T). Notethattheeconomy
is indifferent between the two energy sources as ¸A
X(T)Å¿(T)Æc.
From(23),(4)and(5)followsthat c xA(t)È08t 2(T,TH). Then9TS 2(T,TH)atwhichxA(TS)Æ q.UNILATERAL CLIMATE POLICY, BACKSTOP ADOPTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE 22
Suppose c Æ c0 ´ {cj¯ y Æ 1
2±Z}. Then, under Assumptions 1-3, at t Æ T N
b , region A has not yet
exhausted its resource stock. However, it is not possible to have the constraint binding (which
requires xA(T N
b )Æ±Z) and simultaneously have qA(T N
b ) continuous. If we increase c from c to
c0, such that Assumptions 1-3 still hold, we will ﬁnd a c Æ ˜ c, c0 Ç ˜ c Ç c. For c0 2 (c, ˜ c), T N
b Ç TH
and qA(T N
b ) cannot be continuous, as will be shown in Appendix D.
The rest of the proof follows the proof of Proposition 2.
D Proof of Proposition 4











Denote these stages by I, II, and III, respectively. Clearly, in stage III, ¿(t) Æ 0, so we have
a path of declining emissions, given X A(TH) and M A(TH), until t Æ T A
b , and backstop use af-
terwards. In stage II, the stock constraint is binding, so equations (5) and (19) reduce to the
restriction
xA(t)Æ±Z ¡xN(t), (D.2)
where region A takes xN(t) as given. However, since c 2 (c, ˜ c), xN(t) jumps to zero at t Æ T N
b ,
and we effectively have to cut stage II in two periods: for t 2 [T,T N
b ], (D.2) with xN(t) ¸ ¯ y is
binding, whereas for t 2(T N
b ,T),
xA(t)Æ±Z (D.3)
is binding. Denote the ﬁrst of these two sub-stages by IIa and the second by IIb. Denote
µIIa the Lagrange multiplier to the restriction in (D.2) and µIIb the Lagrange multiplier to the
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and similarly for the otherV O(¢) functions. In each stage, the stocks at the end of the preceding
stage are taken as initial stocks. We are especially interested in what happens at t Æ T N
b . Fol-
lowing Theorem 7.2.1 of Léonard and Long (1992), the transversality condition for the stock of





























Comparing these results with (D.8)-(D.9), we see that ¸A
X and ¸A
M are continuous at the border
between stage IIa and IIb. Since c 2 (c, ˜ c), xN(t) jumps to zero at t Æ T N
b whereas xA(T N
b ) has
to jump up, in order not to violate (20), which implies that µ(t) must jump down at t ÆT N
b . For
±Z or c sufﬁciently low, ceteris paribus, xA jumps up to ±Z and TH ÈT N
b .
Now we can prove the proposition. Consumption has to be continuous at each point in time,
except for t ÆT N
b , as just shown. Then, given the deﬁnition of ˜ c, the proof of part a follows the
proof of Proposition 3a. The proof of part b follows the proof of Proposition 3b, whereby c Çc0
implies that TC does not exist so yA(t) cannot go to zero continuously but jumps to zero at T N
b
(see proof of Proposition 3). The proof of part c follows the proof of 3d. Part d has been shown
above.
E Proof of Proposition 5











There will be a switch from consumption of non-renewable energy to energy from the back-
stop at t Æ T i
b such that ¸i
X(0)e½T i
b Æ c, from which follows that T i
b Æ (ln(c/¸i
X(0)))/½, given the
optimal initial scarcity rent ¸i


















dt ¡X0 Æ0. (E.1)

















































dX0 È0. This proves part b of the proposition.
The growth rate of consumption is as in (23). Since ¸A
X(0) is higher than under laissez-faire,
xA(t)Ç xi¤
(t)Æ xN(t) 8t, which proves part a.CESifo Working Paper Series 
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